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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78A-3102(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. (2008). The case has been assigned to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Section 78A-4-103(2)(j), Utah Code Ann. (2008).
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal
case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief,
or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper
purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time
that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The above-captioned action was filed by plaintiff Stevensen 3rd East, L.C.
("Stevensen") on May 9, 2001. Stevensen claimed damages against defendant Russell K.
Watts ("Watts") for breach of his duties as the manager of The Club Condominium, L.C.
('The Club"). [R: 1-36.] The issues were narrowed through numerous motions leading
up to Trial, none of which motions have been identified as subject to the present appeal
by Watts.
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Stevensen's claims were tried before a jury on January 22, 2007 through February
1, 2007. [R. 7992, 7995-96, 7998-8002, 8080, 8087.] The jury found that Watts breach
his fiduciary duties owed to Stevensen by a standard of gross negligence or willful
misconduct and returned a verdict against Watts in the amount of $474,000. [R. 81948195.] Based on Stevensen's motion, the Court made a further award of prejudgment
interest, attorneys fees and costs and entered final judgment on September 4, 2007. [R:
8558-8563.] Watts filed a Notice of Appeal on September 19, 2007. [R: 8564-8566.]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee has provided a set of detailed fact with references to the record on pages
25 through 46, below. In order to eliminate unnecessary duplication, said pages are by
this reference incorporated herein as appellee's statement of facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. Appellant has failed to transcribe essential portions of the record. With respect
to appellant's challenges to the jury instructions, appellant failed to transcribe the hearing
on jury instructions held September 6, 2006 and November 15, 2006, resulting in the
order dated November 15, 2006 governing jury instructions. Appellant has also failed to
marshal the evidence necessary to provide the context with which to measure either
questions of law or the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court.
2. Appellant asserts that jury instruction no. 51 was incorrect, because it refers to
the job in which Watts was engaged as the manager of the company. However, the
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instruction follows MUJI 7.30, and appellant acknowledges in their own brief on page 10
that the job in which Watts was engaged was a relevant consideration.

Moreover,

Appellant's own trial witnesses emphasized Watts' extensive qualifications and
superiority as a developer of real estate.

After asking the jury to consider his

qualifications, Appellant cannot in good faith expect this Court to rule that the Trial
Court erred in including such a reference in the jury instructions. The jury would have
considered appellant's profession whether or not it was referenced in the instructions.
3. Appellant objects to the damages instruction given by the Trial Court without
acknowledging the damages evidence presented to the jury by appellant's own expert
witness. Stevensen's expert used exactly the same damages model as appellant's expert.
The only significant difference in damages testimony presented by the parties was that
appellant's expert attempted more aggressive advocacy as to what the jury should
conclude.

Appellant's objection concerning the jury instruction has no relevance

whatsoever to the outcome of the case. In addition, appellant failed to timely submit to
the Trial Court the jury instruction now requested.
4. Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining
the scope of testimony by Stevensen's experts. The testimony appellant describes as
objectionable was both appropriate, because it was relevant, and inconsequential, since
the expert testimony had no inappropriate impact on the outcome of the case. In addition,

appellant's only objection at trial was that Stevensen's experts could testify at all.
Appellant failed at trial to make objection to the specific questions or testimony at issue.
5. Appellant challenges the findings of the jury. Despite the fact that Stevensen
filed a brief describing the evidentiary support for the jury's verdict, in response to
appellant's post-trial motion, appellant has failed to marshal even a fraction of the
relevant evidence. Appellant offers a string of frivolous arguments which ignore the
substantial uncontroverted evidence supporting the verdict. Appellant fails to even state
the law applicable to the jury's finding and, therefore, fails to relate the evidence cited to
the legal standards in the case. There is overwhelming evidence supporting the jury's
verdict.
6. Appellant challenges the award of prejudgment interest without referencing or
discussing the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003
UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064. The parties briefed the issue for the Trial Court, and appellant is
aware that Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc. is the definitive case on point.
7. Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining
the appropriate amount of attorney's fees awarded. Even though appellant failed to file a
timely opposition to the amount of fees requested, the Trial Court nonetheless allowed
appellant to argue the matter.

The Trial Court received supplemental briefing and

scheduled further oral argument on this point and clearly articulated the basis of its
determination in accordance with the case law referenced by appellant.

4

Appellant's

challenge is frivolous both factually as a matter of law, because (1) appellant incorrectly
claims that the Trial Court lacked the necessary information to determine a reasonable
attorney fee, rather than recognizing that the Trial Court was simply of a different
opinion as to significance of the evidence presented, and (2) the law does not permit
pfirties to ask the Appellate Courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the Trial
Court where there is an adequate basis for the Trial Court's decision.
8. Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining
the appropriate amount of costs awarded. Again, the Trial Court received extensive
briefing and oral argument on this point, and clearly articulated the basis of its
determination.
9. A frivolous appeal "is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law." Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(b). Stevensen requests an award of
attorney's fees incurred in responding to the frivolous appeal in this action. Stevensen
further requests that the appeal in this action be dismissed without hearing.
ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO TRANSCRIBE NECESSARY
HEARINGS AND MARSHAL EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO ISSUES OF LAW.
In order the appeal the Trial Court's determination of which jury instructions to
apply, appellant had a duty to this Court to transcribe those hearings in which jury ,
instructions were argued. Hatch v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, par. 46-48, 102 P.3d 774,
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786. "Where the record before us is incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence as
a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and
competent evidence." Id., citing Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App.
1989).
Hearings on jury instructions were held September 6, 2006 and November 15,
2006, resulting in the order dated November 15, 2006 governing jury instructions. [R.
6836, 6965-73.] Appellant has failed to transcribe those hearings. Therefore, appellant's
issue nos. 1 and 2 concerning jury instructions should not be considered or given a
hearing before this Court.
The evidence must even be marshaled where the primary focus of appellant's
challenge is a legal issue. "Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal
ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal
standard is extremely fact sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the
evidence. See, e.g., [In Re Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343] at 1347-49 (explaining that
failure of the appellant to marshal the evidence meant findings were presumed valid,
proving fatal to her legal argument)/' Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, par 20, 100 P.3d
1177,1184-85.
Appellant has discussed its duty to marshal the evidence only relative to its issue
no. 4, the jury's verdict. Appellant fails to recognize that they also have a duty to
marshal the fact sensitive details relative to their presentation of appellant's issue nos. 1,
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2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. Decisions which turn on the discretion of the Trial Court or the
application of the law to a case are not made in a vacuum. Appellant has grossly failed to
marshal the applicable evidence, placing this Court in a position in which it must
conclude that the analysis by the Trial Court was correct. Therefore, appellant's issue
nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 should not be considered or given a hearing before this Court.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 51 IS
SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
As the Utah Court of Appeals stated in Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, par. 12
and 38, 131 P.3d 252, 256 and 262, cited by appellant,
We examine the challenged instructions in context. See Id. "[I]f the jury
instructions as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law, reversible
error does not arise merely because one jury instruction, standing alone, is not as
accurate as it might have been." Id.
To prevail on appeal based on instructions to the jury, this court must find both
that the instruction was inaccurate and that there is "'not a mere possibility, but a
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.'" (citations omitted.)
In the present case, jury instruction no. 5 I was an accurate instruction as to the law
applicable to the case. Appellant cites no case law to support their contention that the
jury instruction was incorrect. Defendant's cite several cases to support their position
that the Trial Court was correct in holding that liability had to be proven to the level of
gross negligence or willful misconduct, but not one of those cases concerns the issue that
appellant is contesting on appeal.1
1

The Trial Court's holding as to the gross negligence standard was error, as the change
in the applicable standard was adopted by the legislature more than two years after the
7

Appellant asserts that jury instruction no. 51 was incorrect, because it refers to the
job in which Watts was engaged as the manager of the company.

However, the

instruction follows the language of MUJI 7.30 (1993). MUJI 7.30 is a very balanced
instruction, indicating to the jury that they may consider the skill and learning ordinarily
possessed by a person in a particular field of employment. However, MUJI 7.30 also
cautions the jury against holding the person to a standard of exceptional skill or caution,
and MUJI 7.30 cautions the jury that a person may make errors of judgment, mistakes in
performance or disagree with others without being negligent. In this case, the Trial Court
actually modified MUJI 7.30 to create a higher burden of proof for Stevensen, not Watts.
The Trial Court added that the jury would need to find that Watts' conduct was so bad
that it constituted gross negligence or willful misconduct. [R. 817211
The MUJI 7.30 instructions is based on case law that addresses the elements of
causation and responsibility for causing damage to others in the construction context.
MUJI 7.30 cites Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co.. 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 918 (1964). In
Whitman, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the issues which were incorporated into
acts alleged and after the date the lawsuit was filed. [R. 6933-43.] Nonetheless, the said
error is not the subject of appeal, because Stevensen was able to prove his case beyond
the higher standard of showing gross negligence or willful misconduct by Watts. [R.
7134-36.] By meeting a burden of proof significantly greater than the burden which
should have been required, Stevensen has removed any doubt that jury instruction no. 51
did not improperly affect the outcome of the case.
The appellate courts will affirm the decision of the lower court if there are any
sustainable grounds found in the record, even if they were not the grounds applied by the
trial court and even if they were not raised on appeal or before the lower court.
Okelberrv v. West Daniels Land Ass'n, 2005 UT App. 327, par 11, 120 P.3d 34, 38.
'The goal of the 'affirm on any ground' rule is judicial economy." Id.
8

MUJI 7.30 and Jury Instruction No. 51 as uthe universally accepted standard of care: that
of the ordinary, reasonable and prudent man under the circumstances."

Id. at 920.

Consequently, Jury Instruction No. 51 actually mitigated in favor of Appellant, because it
cautions the jury not to hold Appellant to a standard of extraordinary skill or caution.
Even if the amendment suggested by appellant were made, jury instruction no. 36
already instructed the jury that the standard of care in this case was based on the learning,
skill and care of builders and developers. [R. 8156.] Appellant made no objection to jury
instruction no. 36 at trial, and appellant fails to claim it was an error as part of its appeal.
Addressing the language injury instruction no. 51 would not in any circumstance have
altered the outcome of the case.
Moreover, most of the testimony was lay testimony from Walts and his
employees.

Watts and other trial witnesses called by Watts emphasized Watts'

qualifications and superiority.

[R. 8586, pp. 368:16-36:8; 8589, pp. 1014:2-1015:16,

1076:14-1078:12; 8590 pp. 1183:16-1184:22, 1185:8-10, 1186:14-1187:18, and so forth.]
Stevensen also presented the testimony of Lynn Larsen as an expert in the field, and
Appellant chose not to rebut that testimony with a defense expert.

Together, the

testimony presented did nothing more than provide the jury with the "circumstances"
from which they were to judge Watts' conduct. The jury instruction did not influence the
jury into thinking that Watts was to be held to some level of conduct higher than uthe
ordinary, reasonable and prudent man under the circumstances." After asking the jury to
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consider his qualifications, appellant cannot in good faith ask this Court to rule that the
Trial Court erred in including a reference to his experience and training in the jury
instructions.
In order allow this Court to even consider whether a change to the jury instruction
might have made a difference, the appellant had the obligation to marshal the evidence
from trial necessary for this Court to determine what those circumstances were or to
assess whether or not the Trial Court's assessment of the circumstances might have
involved any error. Without the benefit of the evidence being marshaled by appellant,
including all the testimony concerning the learning, skill and care of Watts and that
applicable to the industry, this Court must conclude that the jury would have considered
appellant's profession whether or not it was referenced in the instructions, and that the
reference injury instruction no. 51 was of no consequence as a result.
Where the outcome of a matter was unlikely affected by a detail in a jury
instruction, even if the ruling of the Trial Court was incorrect, the matter is not an issue
of reversible error, because there is not a reasonable likelihood that changing the
instruction would have altered the outcome of the case. See Haupt v. Heaps, supra, at par.
38. The jury found against Appellant on the grounds that he breached his fiduciary duties
by a degree of gross negligence or willful misconduct. [R. 8172, 8194.] The evidence
against Watts was so overwhelming and largely undisputed, as discussed under Argument
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V, below, even if the jury had not been instructed that they could consider Appellant's
skill and learning, it would not have changed the outcome.
Appellant should be aware that their appeal is frivolous. Appellant acknowledges
in their own brief on page 10 that "a manager's skill and learning may be considered." If
a manager's skill and learning is a relevant consideration to whether he acted with gross
negligence or willful misconduct, it is difficult to understand why defendant's have
appealed the instruction in question - particularly since they cite no case law to support
their contention.
Appellant's issue no. 1 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact
nor warranted by existing law. Due to the failure to even marshal the necessary evidence
or transcribe the hearings on jury instructions, appellant's brief does not warrant oral
argument.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 53 IS
SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
As with issue no. 1, above, Jury Instruction No. 53 is an accurate instruction as to
the law applicable to the case, and addressing the defect alleged by appellant would not in
any circumstance have altered the outcome of the case. Therefore, there is no reversible
error. See Haupt v. Heaps, supra. In addition, appellant failed to proffer the proposed
instruction at the appropriate time as ordered by the Trial Court. Appellant's proposed
jury instructions simply did not include a requested instruction on the calculation of net
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profits. [R. 4508.] And again, appellant has failed to marshal the evidence necessary to
support their allegations of what occurred at trial.
Jury Instruction No. 53 is based on MUJI 19.16, the damages instruction for
business torts. MUJI 19.16 cites Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
for its support. For the applicable discussion, see id- at 1006-07.
The outcome of the case would not have been affected by the instructions
suggested by the appellant, because the economic expert witnesses of both parties
actually gave the jury identical description of how they derived their gross income/net
profit opinions.

In the first place, the parties presented identical evidence of gross

income and expenses, and most of the financial data from appellant's expert was even
stipulated to by Stevensen's expert simply for purposes of clarity for the sake of the jury.
[R. 8585, p. 261:5-23; 8587, pp.580:12-581:22, 586:19-22, 588:24-589:13; Exhibits 28,
29, 97, 762; 8017, 8020, 8041.] Both parties assumed that the gross profit would have
been identical to the actual amount of gross profit that actually accrued, so there was no
speculation as to income. Second, both experts presented a net profit calculation by
subtracting actual expenses incurred as shown on the books of The Club to arrive at an
actual profit figure. [R. 8587, pp. 581:25-583:2; Exhibits 97and 762; 8020, 8041.] Both
experts arrived at a potential damages figure by informing the jury what the amount owed
to Stevensen would be, depending upon what expenses the jury included in the
accounting based on whether or not it found that Watts had caused certain of those
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expenses by breaching his fiduciary duties. [R. 8587, pp. 584:4-19, 588:15-23, 589:1424; 8589, pp. 1158:4-1159:5, 1162:7-1164:9, Exhibits 97 and 762; 8020, 8041.]
Appellant's expert even agreed on cross examination that given different assumptions
about which expenses were legitimate (versus unauthorized or otherwise inappropriate),
his damages figure would be within $30,000 of the figure presented by Stevensen's
expert. [R. 8589, pp. 1153:1-1155:20.] The result of the presentation of evidence was
that the jury had only one gross profit figure to use as a starting point. The roll of the
jury was then to calculate the net profit on the basis of the dispute between the parties
concerning expenses.

The result was a net profit figure. Adding an instruction

concerning net profit would not have provided any new or unique instruction to the jury.
Such an instruction would not have aided the jury in any way to reach a decision. An
additional jury instruction would not in any way have altered the outcome of the case.
For further discussion of the evidence and why certain expenses were characterized as
resulting from Watts' breach of fiduciary duty, see Argument V, below.
Appellant objects to the damages instruction given by the Trial Court without
marshaling, or even acknowledging, the damages evidence presented to the jury by
Appellant's own expert witness.

Appellant asserts that the jury should have been

instructed concerning the distinction between gross profits and net profits. However, at
no time during the course of trial did either party present any evidence that would have
even permitted the jury to misconstrue the fact that they were being asked to return a
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verdict on the basis of a net profit calculation. While it is nice that appellant has cited
cases which refer to circumstances where a gross income/net profit distinction would be
applicable, appellant has done nothing to demonstrate to this Court that there was actually
a need for such an instruction in this case.
Appellant's issue no. 2 is frivolous, because the appeal is not grounded in fact, and
no change to the instruction is warranted by existing law. The damages instructions
given were appropriate on the basis of the law and the evidence as introduced at trial.
Appellant's argument grossly ignores the fact that the jury made a net profit calculation
and was never presented with any evidence or argument that would have allowed them to
erroneously make a mistake of the nature that appellant's belatedly suggested jury
instruction might have addressed. Of course, this may explain why appellant failed to
timely request such an instruction prior to trial. Again, due to the failure to even marshal
the necessary evidence or transcribe the hearings on jury instructions, appellant's brief
does not warrant oral argument.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS ON EXPERT TESTIMONY
REFLECT PROPER APPLICATION OF ITS DISCRETION.
Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining the
scope of testimony by Stevensen's experts.

The testimony Appellant describes as

objectionable was both appropriate and inconsequential. The expert testimony had no
inappropriate impact on the outcome of the case. Appellant has failed to marshal the
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evidence necessary to support its contention that the outcome would have been different
but for the admission of the testimony.
In addition, appellant failed to make the objections necessary during trial to
preserve any right to appeal the admission of such evidence. At trial, appellant stated
only a general objection to permitting Mr. Larsen to testify at all, which was overruled,
and then failed to make objection to the specific questions or responses necessary to
preserve the present issue for appeal. [R. 8584, p. 76:2-19.] Appellant has also failed to
transcribe the hearing on the relevant motions in limine which was held March 14, 2005,
which resulted in the order concerning expert testimony dated March 16, 2005. [R. 401744.]
Appellant claims that the expert testimony was both irrelevant and prejudicial, but
fails to distinguish the standards applicable on appeal as to issues of relevance and issues
of prejudice.
Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401.
Evidence may be relevant for one purpose but not for others in the same case. See
Olympus Hills Center, Ltd. v. Smith Food, 889 P.2d 445, 454-55 (Utah App. 1995).
Relevance for any purpose will suffice. Id. at 455. In order to prevail on appeal, the
appellant must demonstrate both that the trial court abused its discretion in determining
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the evidence was relevant and that there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result absent the error. Carlson Distributing v. Salt Lake Brewing, 2004 UT App 227 par.
26,95 P.3d 1171, 1178.
With respect to the matter of prejudice, the Court of Appeals stated in Olympus
Hills, "We review a trial court's determination that evidence is not unfairly prejudicial
under an abuse of discretion standard and "reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds
of reasonability."" (cititations omitted.) Olympus Hills, supra, at 455. The evidence
must have the effect of influencing the jury by improper means, appealing to the jury's
sympathies, arousing a sense of horror, or provoking the jury to punish. Id. at 455.
The testimony provided by Stevensen's experts was relevant, but not critical to the
outcome of the case. See Argument V, below. Its exclusion would not have altered the
outcome of the case. Such evidence also had no unfairly prejudicial effect, and certainly
did not exceed the "bounds of reasonability." The fact that the jury found that Watts had
acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct, but then refrained from awarding
punitive damages, is a clear indication that the jury was in control of its emotions and
decision making faculties.
An examination of appellant's arguments demonstrates no link between the expert
testimony and any potential error. With regard to the testimony of Mr. Kesler, appellant
begins on page 14 by stating only two of Mr. Kesler's opinions concerning Mr. Watts'
conduct. Appellant then abandons that discussion without showing how the opinions
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were either irrelevant or prejudicial. Instead, on page 15, appellant next cites his own
cross examination of Mr. Kesler and argues that his cross examination established that
Mr. Kesler's opinions were unreliable. The cross examination shows that Mr. Kesler did
not rely on internal bank records to reach his opinion, which is no surprise because Mr.
Kesler testified that he relied upon the testimony of Mr. Watts and upon the loan
documents that he did review. Appellant fails to marshal any evidence to address the
basis for Mr. Kesler's testimony. Appellant then continues on page 15 to conclude that
Mr. Kesler's testimony was irrelevant, because parties are not legally required to conform
to industry standards. Appellant tacitly acknowledges that Mr. Watts did not follow
industry standards, which of course undermines their immediately preceding argument
that Mr. Kesler's opinion was unreliable. But appellant fails to even discuss the potential
relevance of Mr. Kesler's opinions to the outcome of the case.

For Stevensen's

discussion of what was relevant in this case, see Argument V., below.
With regard to the testimony of Mr. Larsen, appellant begins on page 16 by
addressing only four statements by Mr. Larsen. With regard to the first and second
statements, while it might be relevant that a cost-plus contract is disfavored because it
lends itself to abuse or that Mr. Watts favored his father in contracting with him as the
architect, Stevensen stipulated that it did not claim that the contract was unfair or a
breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, while the statements were relevant, there could have
been no prejudice.

Appellant does not reference making any motion to strike the
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testimony or admonish the jury.

Therefore no right to appeal the statement was

preserved. With regard to the third statement, it was relevant that the agreements were
not managed on an arms-length basis. As appellants acknowledge, Watts was reporting
only to himself as both the manager of The Club and as the president of the contractor,
which arrangement made it easy for Watts to engage in self dealing and hide his
inappropriate actions. In dealing with the architect in particular, Watts purposefully
excluded the architect from involvement with the financial details of the project, which
allowed Watts to implement design and finish changes which took the project millions of
dollars over budget and grossly extended the timeframe for construction. [R. 8584:91:295:25, 110:7-114:9; 8588, pp. 974:22-975:12.] This is the context for Mr. Larsen's
concern with Watts' violation of industry standards. The construction records showed
that the project was on budget and being build in accordance with the plans dated June
20, 1997 though October 1998. [R. 8588, pp. 980:3-981:11; Exhibit 685 (see both draw
reports and the inspection report bates stamped 2000372-76); 8038] As far as the
architect knew, the project was on budget and on schedule and he had no idea how the
matters alleged by Watts could have taken the project millions of dollars over budget and
delayed completion of the construction by more than one year. [R. 8584, pp. 101:14104:13; 8588, pp. 980:3-986:5] With regard to the fourth statement, Mr. Larsen's opinion
that Watt's intentionally went over budget, enriching his construction company at the
expense of The Club and Stevensen, is the basis for his contention that under those
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circumstances, charging interest on the cost overruns was a magnification of the
wrongdoing of Watts in the first place.
Appellant fails to marshal the evidence necessary to give this Court the context for
any of Mr. Larsen's statements.

Without the proper context, this Court is not in a
Si

position to consider either the relevance of the statements or the potential of any
inappropriate prejudicial effect.

There is no indication that appellant preserved any

objection with respect to the statements, and there is certainly nothing to show that the
Trial Court acted "beyond the bounds of reason ability" in determining that the statements
were not unduly prejudicial.
Appellant's issue no. 3 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact
nor warranted by existing law. Appellant asks this Court to assume that appellant's own
cross examination Mr. Kesler was prejudicial, and that statements of Mr. Larsen
proffered without any context were at the same time both irrelevant and prejudicial
"beyond the bounds of reasonability" on the part of the Trial Court. Due to the failure to
even marshal the necessary evidence, appellant's brief does not warrant oral argument.
V. APPELLANT FAILS TO PROPERLY CHALLENGE
THE JURY'S FINDINGS.
Appellant challenges the findings of the jury. Despite the fact that Stevensen filed
a brief describing the evidentiary support for the jury's verdict, in response to Appellant's
post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict [R. 8349-63], appellant has
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nonetheless failed to marshal the relevant evidence. Appellant offers a string of frivolous
arguments which ignore the substantial uncontroverted evidence supporting the verdict.
Appellant also seems to ignore that the jury found Watts liable by a standard of
gross negligence or willful misconduct for breach of fiduciary duty. By failing to cite to
any case law which discusses the relevant elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty,~ appellant has not tied a single scrap of evidence to the findings that were made
with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim.
A. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE RELEVANT EVIDENCE
WITH RESPECT TO THE JURY'S FINDINGS.
Appellant is aware of his failure to marshal the necessary evidence. In footnote 5
on page 18 of his brief, appellant asks this Court to review the record on its own.
However, appellant has already acknowledged his marshaling obligation in this case. In
his Motion to Reconsider Page Limitation, dated August 22, 2008, appellant states:
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan
Manufacturing Corp., 101 UT 94, par. 21, 54 P.3d 1177, that
To mount a successful attack upon a trial court's findings of fact, an
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and
then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below.

" Appellants Issue no. 4, encompassing pages 18-55, fails to include any discussion of
the elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. While the argument contains
scattered citations to case law concerning evidentiary standards, the only citation to a
case that even mentions breach of fiduciary duty appears on lines 6-8 on page 34, for the
proposition that failure to disclose is not a breach of fiduciary duty where the plaintiff has
access to the books of the company.
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"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced a trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists." Neely v. Bennett 202 UT app 189, par 11, 51 P.3d 724
(emphasis added). See also Ryan D. Tenney, The Utah Marshaling Requirement:
An Overview, Utah Bar Journal, August/September, 2004, p. 2 ("There are two
chief requirements that must be satisfied in order to properly fulfill the marshaling
requirement. First the marshaling should be correctly located, and second, the
marshaling should be thorough") (emphasis added). "The marshaled facts should
'correlate to particular items of evidence with the challenged finding, * Majestic,
818 P.2d at 1315, supporting the findings with all available evidence in the record
..." Nedy, 2002 UT App 189, par 11 (emphasis added).
This Court has previously stated that an appellant cannot use the appellatebrief page limitation to excuse his or her duty to fulfill the marshalling
requirement. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Our
insistence on compliance with the marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting
hypertechnical adherence to form over substance.") ...
As discussed below, appellant's issue no. 4 is structured as a straw man argument,
completely ignoring the need to 1) thoroughly and completely marshal the relevant
evidence, 2) construe the evidence in the light supporting the verdict, and 3) then identify
any deficiency in the evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court explained in Chen v. Stewart, supra, 2004 UT 82, par
77-78, 100 P.3d at 1195, as follows:
What appellants cannot do is merely re-argue the factual case they presented in the
trial court. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d
1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The process of marshaling is thus fundamentally different from that of presenting
the evidence at trial. The challenging party must "temporarily remove its own
prejudices and fully embrace the adversary's position"; he or she must play the
"devil's advocate." Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, % 19, 57 P.3d 1093. In so doing,
appellants must present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court,
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Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998), and not attempt
to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their case. In re Estate of Bartell,
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Appellants cannot merely present carefully
selected facts and excerpts from the record in support of their position. Oneida,
872 P.2d at 1053. Nor can they simply restate or review evidence that points to an
alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's finding of fact. Wilson
Supply, 2002 UT 94 at If 22.
The Utah Supreme Court further explained that "an appellee need only point to a scintilla
of evidence that supports a court's findings in order to refute an appellant's claim of no
evidence." Id. at par 82.
In the present case, appellants have failed marshal even a fraction of the evidence
and have failed to present the evidence to this Court in the manner required for an appeal.
That failure by itself is grounds for dismissal of the appeal. See Chen, supra, at par. 74.
Stevensen need only present a scintilla of evidence to refute the appeal at issue.
B. STEVENSEN EASILY MET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF AT TRIAL.
Before examining all of the limited evidence and conclusory statements presented
in appellant's brief, it is important to understand Stevensen's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty and the law applicable to the claim. Appellant's brief fails to include any
discussion of the breach of fiduciary duty, its elements, how the evidence relates to each
of those elements, or the burden of proof. Appellant does not challenge jury instruction
no. 46, which defined fiduciary duty as including "the duties of good faith, honesty,
loyalty and due care." [R. 8166-67.] See also 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section
1460 (2004). Further instructions concerning the duties of the appellant are contained in
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jury instruction nos. 47, 48, 49, 50, none of which were challenged by the appellant either
at trial or on appeal. [R.8168-71.] Those instructions informed the jury that Watts had
duties of care, loyalty, honesty and good faith. In addition, the Trial Court should have
provided other instructions to the jury concerning appellant's duties and potential
liability/ The verdict of the jury must be sustained on any of those grounds if there is
3

The Trial Court placed the burden of proof on Stevensen to show that Watts breached
his fiduciary duties. In fact, the jury should have been instructed that Watts had the
burden of establishing that he met his fiduciary duties in a variety of contexts.
See Bradbury v. Rasmusen, 401 P.2d 710, 713 fn. 4 (Utah 1965) (If a confidential
relationship exists by which the person in a superior position benefits, "a presumption
arises that the transaction was unfair; this presumption has the force of evidence and will
itself support a finding if not overcome by countervailing evidence. The burden is on the
superior party ...").
The manager must maintain true and correct books showing the company's
accounts. In a fiduciary capacity, the manager has the burden of showing that he met his
obligation with respect thereto, and all doubts are to be resolved against him. Couri v.
Couri, 447 N.E.2d 334, 337 (111. App. 1983). "The duty of full disclosure required for a
partner to overcome the breach of fiduciary duty is especially great when the breaching
partner is experienced in business compared to the nonbreaching partner. 59A Am. Jur.
2d, Partnership, section 285 (2003).
59A Am.Jur. 2d, Partnership, section 397 (2003) provides,
A managing partner has the burden of proving his or her innocence where there is
a question of his or her compliance with fiduciary duties to the partnership or other
partners. As the dominant party in a partnership relationship, a managing partner
faces a presumption of fraud or undue influence when he or she gains a benefit
from his or her fiduciary relationship with copartners, and he or she can over come
the presumption only by clear and convincing proof that he or she acted with faith,
honesty in fact, and full and fair disclosure of relevant information.
When a company officer is responsible for the administration of an agreement
between himself and the company, the officer has the burden of showing his good faith
and fair dealing. See C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah App.
1995); Saballus v. Timke, 460 N.E.2d, 755, 760 (111. 1983). In a closely held company or
one in which one party hold a position as the sole manager, such as the present case,
utmost good faith and loyalty are required. 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 1460
(2004). The heightened duty of good faith and loyalty means that a manager must dispel
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evidence in the record which would have supported a finding of liability. See Okelberry
v. West Daniels Land Ass'n, 2005 UT App. 327, par 11, 120 P.3d 34, 38.
With regard to the standard of willfulness or gross negligence, the evidence
supports the jury's determination that Watts' wrongful acts were done willfully or with
gross negligence. At least three defense witnesses ended their testimony by describing
how skillful and attentive Watts was in the performance of his duties as the manager of
the construction project.

[R. 8589, pp. 1014:2-1015:16, 1076:14-1078:12; 8590 pp.

1183:16-1184:22, 1185:8-10, 1186:14-1187:18, and so forth.] From that testimony, the
jury could have concluded that Watts knew exactly what he was doing and that he acted
willfully when he did the things that the jury determined gave rise to Watts' breach of
fiduciary duty.
There are several scenarios which support the jury's finding of liability, several of
which scenarios are based upon evidence that is undisputed. Defendant's motion must be
denied if the court finds sufficient evidence to support even one instance in which Watts
all doubts concerning his or her conduct, and that if he is unable to carry that burden, all
doubts, will ordinarily be resolved against him. 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, sections
280-81 (2003). The burden on a manager of a closely held company is in addition to the
burden imposed on an officer or manager engaged in self dealing. 59A Am.Jur. 2d,
Partnership, section 397 (2003) also provides,
A managing partner has the burden of proving his or her innocence where there is
a question of his or her compliance with fiduciary duties to the partnership or other
partners. As the dominant party in a partnership relationship, a managing partner
faces a presumption of fraud or undue influence when he or she gains a benefit
from his or her fiduciary relationship with copartners, and he or she can over come
the presumption only by clear and convincing proof that he or she acted with faith,
honesty in fact, and full and fair disclosure of relevant information.
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breached either the fiduciary duty of a care, loyalty, honesty or good faith. The evidence
was overwhelming that Watts breached all of the fiduciary duties owed to Stevensen.
1. Russell Watts Violated the Duty of Care.
The law requires a manager to use the ordinary skill and diligence expected in the
construction industry to benefit the company and increase its profits.4 The evidence
established that Watts breached the Duty of Care he owed as the manager of the Club,
including but not limited to the following facts:
1. Construction industry standards require that for a project of the nature of The
Club a construction budget and design be established at the beginning of the construction
project and that thereafter variations to the cost be minimized to ensure that the project is
completed within the available budget.

[R. 8584, pp. 81:22-83:8, 106:14-108:14.]

Construction industry standards also require oversight by an architect or similar
professional, to ensure that the contractor proceeds with construction on time and
consistent with the budget for the project.

[R. 8584, pp. 85:22-86:13, 93:13-96:1,

100:23-101:23.] Industry standards also protect the interests of the owner through
4

xx

Directors and officers are obligated to use their ingenuity, influence, and energy,
and to employ all the resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the property
and earning power of the corporation, even if the interests of the corporation are in
conflict with their own personal interests." C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896
P.2d 47, 54 (Utah App. 1995). See also 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, sections 280, 395
(2003).
For a discussion of the applicable industry standards see references to the expert
testimony of Lynn Larsen and Henry Kesler. Again, appellant does not challenge jury
instruction no. 36, which identifies the fact that industry standards are relevant to the
duties imposed on appellant. [R. 8156.]
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contract provisions. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-93:3.] Stevensen as a member of The Club was
entitled under industry standards to the protection of paragraphs 4.1 and 6.1 of the
Operating Agreement of The Club, paragraphs 4.1, 4.2 and 16.1.7 of the contract between
The Club and Watts Construction, section 2.6 of the contract between The Club and the
architect; and provisions in the loan documents also prohibited a change in the
construction budget and required timely completion. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-93:3; Exhibits 4,
10, 11, 18 and 685; 8016 and 8038.] Paragraph 16.1.7 of the construction contract, in
particular, references the June 25, 1997 budget, which would have been given to the bank
before the construction loan of July 11, 1997 was authorized, and the bank's construction
draw records verify that the amount payable to Watts Corporation on the project totaled
$5,171,500. [R. Exhibits 10 (last page) and 6855; 8016 and 8038.] Even Watts testified
that there was a contractual obligation to complete construction no later than November
1998. [R. 8590, p. 1311:7-12.] As the manager of The Club, Watts was the person
responsible for enforcement of the construction contract with Watts Corporation. [R.
8590, p. 1315:4-7, 17-20.] The Operating Agreement of the Club prohibited Watts from
changing the design or the budget for the project without written authorization from
Stevensen, which was never given. [R. Exhibit 4, paragraphs 4.1 last sentence and 6.1
(page 3, bates stamped 101074); 8016.]
5

Numerous copies of the bank budget appear in Exhibit 685, such as pages bates
stamped 200075-76, which provide that the construction costs on lines 2015-9600 plus
the 8% construction fee total $4,984,000, together with the asbestos and demolition costs
of $187,500 making the total amount budgeted to Watts Corporation $5,171,500.
26

2. The industry standards are based on the fact that any change in the budget
creates two risks that are relevant to the interests of the owner, which the relevant
contract provisions are also designed to protect the owner against. [R. 8584, pp. 95:1196:1, 101:14-104:13, 106:14-108:14.] First, an increase in the budget created a risk that
the project would run out of construction funds. The loan from the bank was sufficient to
ensure the completion of the project with construction costs of $5,171,500 as represented
to the bank. [R. Exhibits 16, 18 and 685; 8016 and 8038.] Watts Corporation exceeded
its budget by a full 50%, exceeding the amount allocated for constructions costs by the
budget by $2,775,907 and charging construction costs of $7,939,407 as of May 31, 2000.
[R. 8587, p. 586:11-12; Exhibits 54 (last page) and 97 (Exhibit C); 8018, 8020.] Second,
any redesign associated with a change in the budget created a risk that completion of the
construction would be delayed, and, in fact, there was a significant delay resulting from
the failure to follow industry standards. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-93:3, 101:18-104:13.] The
bank inspector noted the delay in October 1998 and recommended restricting the loan to
protect the bank against the delay. [R. 8590, p. 1312:15-23; Exhibit 685 (pages bates
stamped 200372-76).]
3. Watts was aware of the risks. [R. 8590, pp. 1273:22-1274:1.] Watts
intentionally borrowed less than the amount needed to complete the construction. [R.
8585, pp. 249:4-13, 250:3-11; 8586, pp. 535:21-536:3; 8590, p. 1324:18-19; 8996 and
8998.] The charges in excess of the budget caused the construction to run out of money
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ill October 1998 when approximately $3,800,000 to 4,200,000 of the $7,939,407
ultimately charged by the Watts Corporation had been paid. [R. 8590, pp. 1302:241304:10, 1335:8-11; Exhibits 97 (Exhibit C) and 685 (page bates stamped 200370 shows
that construction costs were disbursed 81% right before the bank's inspection report,
which is pages bates stamped 200372-76. Of the $5,175,000 budgeted to construction
costs, 81% is approximately $4,200,000); R. 8038, 8993.] As a result, the bank placed a
limit on further disbursements for construction, even though there was actually $465,538
that was never disbursed of the $5,520,000 originally borrowed. [R. 8585, pp. 266:14267:14, 268:1-14; 8590, pp. 1300:14-18, 1301:12-24; Exhibit 13; 8017.] Even though
the construction could have been completed within budget by the end of 1998, Watts
began making design changes at that time which increased the cost and delayed
completion of construction. [R. 8585, pp. 195:16-198:7; 8590, pp. 1304:12-21; Exhibit
76; 8019.] The construction was completed behind schedule by between 8 and 12
months, bringing total interest charges and fees for loan extensions to the Club up to
$1,046,978, nearly $750,000 greater than the October 1997 budget. [R. 8584, pp. 91:293:3, 94:18-25; 8589, p. 15-22; Exhibits 22, 70 (second page), 97 (Exhibit D) and 762 ;
8017, 8019-20 and 8041.]
4. Mr. Larsen testified that Watts did not comply with industry standards
requiring (1) that he build from a fixed plan and fixed budget, (2) that an architect or
similar professional monitor the construction to ensure that it remained within the design
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and budget parameters, and (3) that he honor the contractual terms governing
construction. [R. 8584, pp. 86:25-87:6,91:2-93:3, 100:23-101:23, 110:7-114:9.] The
architect, Johnathan Dazley, was instructed not to monitor the conformance of the work
to the budget, despite the critical role of the architect in ensuring timely performance of
construction within budget. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-95:25; 8588, pp. 974:22-975:12; 8590:511.] Watts received the bank inspector's report in October 1998, informing him that the
bank was taking action to limit the construction loan because construction was behind
schedule. [R. 8590, p. 1312:15-25.] Watts ignored his responsibilities as the manager of
The Club to enforce the contract with the architect and with Watts Corporation or to
otherwise ensure that the construction was completed on time and within an appropriate
budget. Watts testified that he continued making changes as the project went forward.
[R. 8586, p. 377:7-21.]
5. The construction project did not run out of money and time until approximately
October 1998. [R. 8585, pp. 270:20-271:9; 8586, p. 391:7-22.] Johnathan Dazely
testified that as of October 1998, the construction had been built in accordance with the
1997 construction drawings. [R. 8588, pp. 980:3-981:11.] The draw reports and the audit
report prepared by the bank's representative in October 1998 also showed that the
construction was within $110,000 the parameters of the $5, 171,500 construction budget
represented to the bank. [R. 8590, pp. 1304:12-21; Exhibit 685 (see the audit report bates
stamped 200372-76, and the draw reports throughout the exhibit, such as pages bates
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stamped 200369-70); 8038.] Mr. Larsen also testified that the condominiums could have
been completed for a grand opening of October 17, 1998 if not for design changes that
occurred after August 4, 1998. [R. 8585, pp. 195:16-198:7; Exhibit 76; 8019.] Watts
testified that as late as September 17, 1998, they had been planning on a grand opening in
November 1998. [R. 8586, pp. 393:10-20.] However, at that time the bank noted that the
construction was behind schedule, and steps were taken to restriction the construction
loan as a result, and the bank informed Watts thereof. [R. 8585, pp. 266:14-267:14,
268:1-13; 8590, p. 1312:15-25.] However it was only after October 1998 that the finish
work began, and changes in the finish detail were the only factors that Watts ever
identified as being the cause for the project not being completed on time or on budget.
[R. 8590, p. 1321:17-23.] In other words, the design changes made by Watts in violation
of his duty of care were made AFTER the project had run out of money and AFTER the
construction was out of time per the construction contract and the loan agreement with
the bank, even though the project could have been completed very nearly on time and on
budget. [R. 8590, p. 1324:3-1325:24.] The design changes made after that critical
juncture virtually guaranteed losses to The Club based on the late fees and interest
charged by the bank and by Watts Corporation. .[R. 8585, pp. 181:25-198:7: 8586, pp.
391:7-22,535:21-536:3,8994.]
6. Mr. Larsen also testified that design changes after subcontractors had been
engaged to perform the work were more costly, that there was no evidence that any
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design change actually contributed to an increase in the sale price of any unit, and many
other matters demonstrating that Watts' actions as the manager of The Club were the
proximate cause of the financial losses suffered by Stevensen. [R. 8584, pp. 106:14109:16; 8585, p. 182:14-198:7.]
2. Russell Watts Violated the Duty of Loyalty.
The law prohibits a manager from placing his own interests above the interests of
the company. His loyalty must be to the company he serves.6 The evidence established
that Watts breached the Duty of Loyalty he owed as the manager of the Club, including
but not limited to the following facts:
1. The payments of money to Watts Corporation and other Watts' businesses were
fixed by a budget authorized by Stevensen. Watts was required by contract, and also
required by the duty of loyalty, to perform his duties for the agreed amount of money.
(See discussion of contract terms, above.) [R. Exhibits 4, 10, 11, 18 and 685; 8016 and
8038.]
6

The fiduciary duties of good faith and loyalty, required Watts to honor contract terms,
such as the provisions of the Operating Agreement and the March Agreement which
defined the interests of both Watts and Stevensen. See Saballus v. Timke, 460 N.E.2d
755, 759 (111. 1983); 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 1460, 1468 (2004). A
manager has an obligation to conduct the affairs of the company in such a manner as to
avoid damage to the interests of the members of the company, or damage to the
company's interests. See C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., supra, at 54 (Utah
App. 1995). 59A Am.Jur.2d, Partnership, sections 280, 395 (2003). "In an effort to
assure that corporate directors5 acts are fair, just and equitable to all of the stockholders
courts have adopted and are strictly and rigidly enforcing a policy which minimizes the
temptation of officers of corporation to prefer their own interests rather than those of the
corporation and the shareholders." Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982).
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2. Because of his position of trust as a fiduciary, Watts was prohibited from
performing in a manner that might create an added risk or otherwise cause Stevensen to
lose money while payments to Watts Corporation or other Watts businesses were
increased above the agreed payment amount. In obtaining authorization from Stevensen
for any increase in the budget, the duty of loyalty required Watts to (a) fully disclose the
risk to Stevensen and (b) ensure that the change was also fair to Stevensen. [See footnote
6]
3. Watts was aware that his decision to increase the budget for finish details
would benefit his company Watts Corporation by adding significant additional profit. [R.
8590, pp. 1334:24-1335:7; 1361:16-1364:2.] Earning additional profit for The Club, on
the other hand, was never a factor that Watts considered when increasing the budget or
making changes to the finish. [R. 8586, pp. 364:13-365:20.] Watts caused Watts
Corporation to breach its contract with The Club and charge The Club for budget and
design changes that resulted in an increase in payment of money to Watts Corporation
and created additional risk and loss to Stevensen, without any corresponding potential
benefit to Stevensen. [R. 8585, pp. 184:10-190:14; 8586, pp. 365:6-367:1, 372:4-11;
8994.] Watts Corporation billed the Club $2,775,907 more that the budget to which the
condominiums were built. [See footnote 5. R. 8585, pp. 188:19-191:14; R. 8587, p.
586:11-12; Exhibits 54 (last page), 97 (Exhibit C) and 685; 8018, 8020 and 8038.] Watts
failed to obtain valid authorization, because (a) he failed to fully disclose the nature of the
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risk to Stevensen and/or (b) the changes were not fair to Stevensen based on the fact that
potential benefit was accruing solely to Watts' interest and without any potential for
benefit to Stevensen, as discussed throughout Argument V.B. [R. 8587, pp. 617:1269:18.] Watts provided no updates to Stevensen with respect to the changes in projected
costs and income between October 1997 and 1998. [R. 8585, pp. 256:15-257:8; Exhibit
23; 8017.] Watts subsequently provided no updates to Stevensen with respect to changes
in projected costs and income between October 1998 and September 1999. [R. 8585, p.
313:11-21; 8587, p. 617:18-618:4; 8590, pp. 1327:10-20; Exhibit 24; 8017.]
4. Watts was also aware that increasing construction costs after October 1998, at a
time when The Club was unable to pay Watts Corporation, would result in significant
interest charges from Watts Corporation to The Club. [R. 8590, pp. 1335:8-20.] There
was no corresponding benefit to The Club in incurring additional interest charges,
whether it was being paid to Watts Corporation or a third party. Watts, in fact,
significantly increased the costs of construction between October 1998 and September
1999 without even disclosing the changes or the risks he was taking to Stevensen. [R.
8584, pp. 101:14-104:13, 105:12-108:17; 174:10-17; 8586, pp. 374:7-375:6, 411:11417:2; 8587, pp. 617:12-619:5; Exhibits 23 and 24; 8017.] The revised budget which
Watts finally disclosed after the end of the intervening year showed that construction
costs to Watts Corporation had risen to $7,246,000, that interest had risen to $528,000,
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and that the profit to the project had vanished. [R. 8585, pp. 258:8-259:10; Exhibits 23
and 24; 8017.] It ultimately rose to $7,939,407. [R. Exhibit 97 (Exhibit C); 8020.]
5. In dealing with the Watts Group, Watts caused The Club to pay $374,740 in
advertising expenses on top of the real estate commissions that were paid to the Watts
Group. [R. Exhibits 84-86, 88-93, 97 and 762; 8020 and 8041.] Defendants' own expert
testified that at the commission rate being paid to the Watts Group, other real estate
agents would have paid a substantial amount of the advertising expenses. [R. 8588, pp.
809:2-811:25.] Watts and Stevensen agreed upon the commission paid to the Watts
Group, but Watts made no disclosure to Stevensen and obtained no consent for payment
of $374,740 in advertising without any contribution from the Watts Group. [R. 8587. pp.
623:14-624:16; Exhibit 7; 8016.] Watts even testified that Watts Group was supposed to
be responsible for all marketing. [8585, p. 306:22-23.]
3. Russell Watts Violated the Duty of Honesty.
The law requires that a manager be truthful and disclose all information that is
relevant to the manager's dealings with the members of the company.7 The evidence

7

The fiduciary duty of honesty required Watts to make a true and full disclosure of all
information affecting the affairs of the company. See C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics,
Inc., supra at 54. "The duty of candor, integral to fair dealing, also dictates that
fiduciaries, corporate or otherwise, may not use superior information or knowledge to
mislead others in the performance of their own fiduciary obligations. Thus, while
occupying a fiduciary relationship, the officer and directors of a corporation are
precluded from receiving any personal advantage without the fullest disclosure to, and
assent of, all concerned." 18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 1485 (2004). 59A
Am.Jur. 2d, Partnership, section 283 (2003) also provides:
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established that Watts breached the Duty of Honesty he owed as the manager of the Club,
including but not limited to the following facts:
1. Watts intended to violate the applicable industry standards as early as 1997,
because (a) he purposefully borrowed insufficient funds for the completion of the Club
condominiums at the cost for construction of $6,700,000 that he intended to spend; and
(b) he falsely informed the bank that he intended to spend only $5,102,000 on
construction costs. [R. 8585, pp. 249:4-13, 250:3-11; 8586, pp. 405:10-407:5; 8590, pp.
1296:7-12, 1296:25-1297:20, 1324:18-19; Exhibits 685; 8038, 8996 and 8998.]
According to the architect and the individual hired by the bank to inspect the progress of
construction, the design changes were not implemented prior to October 1998. [R. 8588,
pp. 980:3-981:11; 8590, p. 1312:15-23; Exhibit 685 (pages bates stamped 200372-76).]
Given the fact that the construction was not on track to be completed on time, design
changes that would increase the budget and delay construction after October 1998 were
no longer justified or even prudent. [R. 8590, p. 1324:3-1325:24.] Yet, Watts failed to
provide truthful information to Stevensen with respect to any aspect of the problems with
the construction. Instead, Watts consistently gave Stevensen the same false information
In dealing between partners with regard to fiduciary duties, a partner has no duty
to use any means to discover a fraud perpetrated against him or her by another
partner, or to make any investigation of the truth or falsity of representations made
to him or her by another partner, particularly in face of evidence sustaining an
implied finding that the misrepresenting partner has superior knowledge with
respect to business matters. The fiduciary relation between partners may entitle
one to rely on the opinions, predications, or promises of the other under
circumstances that would not constitute misrepresentation as between parties
dealing at arms length.
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that Watts was giving to the bank. [R. 8585, p. 251:14-25; 8586, p. 373:15-23; 8590, p.
1291:5-8; Exhibits 21, 441 and 685; 8017, 8027 and 8038.] Watts acknowledged that
Stevensen would not be able to determine from the information being provided by Watts
whether or not the project was on budget. [R. 8586, pp. 374:7-375:6.]
2. In October 1998, Watts Corporation was in breach of its construction
agreement as a result of the failure to complete the construction on time. [R. 8586, pp.
407:6-409:15.] Watts did not enforce the rights of the Club relative to the breach of the
Watts Corporation or inform Stevensen that Watts Corporation was in breach. [R. 8584,
pp. 101:14-104:13, 105:12-108:17; 174:10-17; 8586, pp. 411:11-417:2; 8587, pp. 617:12619:5.]
3. In October 1998, the construction project ran out of money and could not pay
its debts to Watts Corporation. [R. 8585, pp. 269:3-271:9; 8590, p. 1335:8-11.] No
design changes to the finish detail had been built by that time. [R. 8588, pp. 980:3981:11; Exhibit 685; 8038.] Watts did not inform Stevensen that money could be saved
or risk reduced by foregoing the alleged design changes, if any. [R. ; 8587, p. 618:12-17.]
4. Beginning in September 1996 and ending in September 1999, Watts told
Stevensen that the project would earn a profit of $800,000, without ever disclosing to
Stevensen that there was a risk to that profit arising from the Watts Corporation's failure
to adhere to the construction schedule or the construction budget. [R. ; 8587, p. 617:18618:4; Exhibits 19, 20, 22, 23, 24 and 54 (last page); 8016-18.] Watts acknowledged that
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in his discussions with Stevensen about the cost-plus aspect of the project, he always
gave Stevensen the up-side potential and never discussed with him the down-side risks.
[R. 8586, p. 421:13-19.] Watts also acknowledged that he did not inform Stevensen of
the interest that would be charged by Watts Corporation. [R. 8586, p. 422:15-19.]
5. Watts continued to increase the budget, primarily through design changes that
occurred between November 1998 and September 1999, without providing Stevensen
with truthful information with respect thereto. [R. 8585, p. 313:11-21; 8587, p. 617:18618:4; 8590, pp. 1327:10-20; Exhibits 23 and 24; 8017.] Lynn Larsen testified that
because of a lack of plans and set bids for either the original plans or the changes as they
occurred, Watts lacked sufficient information to even know how far over budget he was
going as he engage in ongoing redesign. [R. 8584, pp. 101:14-104:13, 105:12-108:17.]
Yet, Watts continued to represent to Stevensen that he was on budget even long after he
knew he was well over the budget represented. [R. 8587, p. 617:18-619:18.] Even Watts
testified that until September 1999, Watts consistently told Stevensen that he was
projecting an $800,000 profit in addition to full payment of $770,000 for the land
contributed by Stevensen. [R. 8590, pp. 1327:10-20.] Incredibily, Watts even
represented to Stevensen in March 1999 that Watts was projecting selling all 47 units by
June 1999. [8586, pp. 432:17-433:10; Exhibit 51; 8018.]
6. Lynn Larsen testified that Watts took no action to adhere to any budget or time
limit at any time during the process of completing the construction, despite the fact that
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he could have at any time stopped redesigning and adhered to a fixed budget and timeline
to complete the construction in accord with the existing plans. [R. 8584, pp. 107:25108:17.]
7. The first time that Watts ever told Stevensen that the profit to the project was at
risk was in September 1999, after the construction was complete and there was not longer
anything Stevensen could say or do. [R. 8587, p. 617:18-619:18; 8590, pp. 1327:10-20;
Exhibit 24; 8017.] When Stevensen objected, Watts immediately refused to have
anything further to do with Stevensen, even though Stevensen never did anything to harm
the project in any way. [R. 8585, pp. 315:16-319:9.]
4. Russell Watts Violated the Duty of Good Faith.
The law prohibits a manager from doing anything that would tend to deprive the
company and its members of the expectations created by the relationship they have with
the manager.8 The evidence established that Watts breached the Duty of Good Faith he
owed as the manager of the Club based on the following facts:
1. The Duty of Good Faith prohibited Watts using his position as the manager of
the Club from doing anything that would tend to depri\e Stevensen of his rightful
expectations to receive repayment for the land he invested, payment of Stevensen's share

8

18B Am.Jur.2d, Corporations, section 1460 (2004); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess,
820 F. Supp 1359, 1366 (D. Utah 1993). The Court in Resolution Trust stated, "the
director's fiduciary duty of loyalty and the requirement of good faith may not be
eliminated or limited." Id. at 1366
See also footnote 5, above.
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of profit from the project, and payment of the 1% fee due under the March 25, 1999
agreement. [R. Exhibit 7; 8016.J
2. Stevensen had a right to expect that Watts would cause Watts Corporation to
adhere to an authorized construction budget. Stevensen's right to expect adherence to a
budget was created by the fact that references to a budget were contained in paragraph
4.1 of the Operating Agreement, paragraph 16.1.7 of the construction agreement with
Watts Corporation, and the construction draw reports given to Stevensen by Watts on an
ongoing basis. [R. 8590, pp. 1291:5-8; Exhibits 4, 10, 19-24; 8016-17.] The budget was
also agreed upon with the bank, and construction draws reports showed that the bank at
all times believed that the condominiums were being built within the budget represented
and included as part of the loan documents. [R. Exhibit 685; 8038.]
3. The parties agreed that Watts would ultimately receive a single fee for the
construction, consisting of the 8% payment to Watts Corporation for building the
condominiums. [R. 8587, pp. 627:8-628:11; Exhibits 4 (paragraph 7.1 on page 4) and 7,
(paragraph 9); 8016.] However, Watts misconstrued the written agreements and claimed
payment of an 18% fee, by paying his companies both the 8% fee due to the Watts
Corporation and an additional $451,000 fee. [R. 8590, p. 1361:16-23.] Watts
acknowledged at trial that the language of Exhibit 7 did not provide for payment of any
fee other than the fee payable to Watts Corporation. [R. 8586, pp. 436:13-437:21.] When
there appeared to still be money left in the budget to go to Stevensen, Watts billed the
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$451,000 fee a second time. [R. 8589, pp. 1148:11-13. 1150:1-13; 8590, pp. 1364:31368:14.]
4. In September 1999, the proforma budget prepared by Watts as the manager of
the Club showed a profit of only $50,000, but still showed $770,000 in the budget for
payment for Stevesen's land. [R. Exhibit 24; 8017.] As late as July 2000, Stevensen's
capital account balance was still at least $367,729 according to Watts' own accountants.
[R. 8589, p. 1141:5-2; Exhibit 54 (second page); 8018.] It would have required
additional losses of $721,000 before Stevensen would not be entitled to additional
payment based on his capital account. [R. 8589, pp. 1141:25-1143:19.] However, Watts
caused the Club to stop making any payments to Stevensen years before even a fraction
of such losses were realized. Even as late as 2002, Watts' accountants showed Stevensen
with a capital account of $149,058. [R. 8589, p. 1150:14-20.] When payment of the 1%
fees were due upon closing of unit sales, Watts made payments to Watts Group and Watts
Corporation, but refused to make payment to Stevensen. [R. 8585, p. 316:11-22; 8590,
pp. 1344:21-1346:3; Exhibit 728; 4023-27 and 8040.] When repayment for land was due
under the March 25, 1999 agreement, Watts made payments to Watts Corporation, but
refused to make payment to Stevensen. [R. 8586, pp. 366:10-367:1; 8590, pp. 1344:211346:3; Exhibit 7; 8016.]
5. Watts used his position as the manager of the Club to cause Watts Corporation
to exceed the authorized budget and delay the construction of the Club condominiums in
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order to build condominiums that would generate more construction fees and interest for
the Watts Corporation and build the reputation of Watts, without any corresponding
potential benefit to Stevensen. [R. 8584, pp. 91:2-93:3, 101:18-104:13, 106:14-109:16;
8585, pp. 149:6-20, 184:10-190:14; 8586, pp. 364:13-367:1, 372:4-11; Exhibits 23 and
24; 8017 and 8994.] The actions of Watts were the reason that the September 1999
budget prepared by Watts showed the absence of a profit. [R. Exhibit 24; 8017. J
However, rather than requiring his own company to accept even the slightest
responsibility for causing the loss of profit, Watts decided to require Stevensen to
shoulder the loss of all profit and the loss of the value of the land he had invested. [R.
8586, pp. 366:3-367:1.] In addition, Watts caused Watts Corporation to continue to
exacerbate it breach of the construction agreement by further increasing its charges to the
Club by more than $500,000 over the budget represented in September 1999 and then
charging interest on the money that The Club was unable to pay to Watts Corporation.
LR. Exhibits 24, 97 (Exhibit C) and 762; 8017, 8020 and 8041.]
6. After September 1999, Watts continued to act in bad faith, further disregarding
the rights of Stevensen. Watts Corporation was already in serious breach of its
construction agreement. Stevensen had made an objection to the overbudget spending
caused by Watts. [R. 8585, pp 315:16-319:9; 8587, pp. 628:21-630:18.] Stevensen's
objections were not only ignored, Watts actually turned Stevensen's objections into an
excuse to disregard the rights of Stevesen altogether. [R. 8585, pp. 316:11-22; 8586, pp.
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366:10-367:1; 8587, pp. 628:21-631:13, 632:11-18; 8590, pp. 1344:21-1346:3.] Watts
had no basis upon which to assert that the Club would lose enough additional money
before all of the units were sold to eliminate the equity represented by the land and
development fee stated in the budget or the balance owing to Stevensen in his capital
account, because even as late as 2002, three years later, Watts' own accountants were
showing a positive capital account balance for Stevensen. [R. 8589, p. 1150:14-24;
Exhibit 54 (second page); 8018.]
7. Even though money was in the budget and in the capital account, Watts refused
to make payment of fees as they were due. Those fees represented sales commissions,
not draws against profits. [R. Exhibits 7 and 728; 4023-27, 8016 and 8040.] Thus, they
were due on the same basis as the commissions paid to Watts Group. The Club was not
entitled to claim an offset against losses that the company had not even accrued as of
September 1999.
8. Watts refused to make payment beginning in September 1999 out of malice
and an intent to injure Stevensen. In an attempt to eliminate the potential for any profit or
return of capital to Stevensen after September 1999, Watts caused Watts Corporation to
bill the Club for more than $500,000 in further additional unauthorized construction costs
and charged interest thereon. Even though the construction was complete in September
1999 and he was reporting construction expenses of only of $7,246,000, Watts ultimately
caused the Watts Corporation to charge the Club $7,939,407 for construction costs and an
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additional $330,000 in interest purely in reflection of his design to steal all of the
Stevensen profit on the project. [R. Exhibits 24, 97 (Exhibit C) and 762; 8017, 8020 and
8041.] Even when that was not enough to eliminate the balance left in Stevensen's capital
account, Watts refused to make payment of any money due to Stevensen. In 2002, Watts
double billed a development fee of $451,000 to The Club in a further effort to embezzle
the money payable to Stevensen. [R. 8589, pp. 1148:11-13, 1150:1-13; 8590, pp. 1364:31368:14.]
5. The Evidence Supports the Finding of Damages.
Both plaintiff and defendants employed individual economic experts to provide
financial information to the jury. The jury could have used the financial data from either
expert, together with various exhibits containing financial data, to arrive at the verdict of
$474,000 in damages against Watts. The jury employed simple addition and subtraction
to calculate their verdict. Examples of the various factors which the jury may have used
to calculate the total damages include but are not limited to the following:
1. Michael Teuscher testified that there was actually a profit on the project after
payment to Stevensen for the 1% fees and the land. [R. 8587, pp. 580:3-587:13; Exhibit
97; 8020. j Without making any adjustments for anything other than dishonesty by Watts
in presenting his accounting conclusions, Michael Teuscher testified that Stevensen was
entitled to $262,109. [R. 8587, p. 587:4-13; Exhibit 97; 8020.] After making specific
adjustments relative to specific categories associated with Watts' breach of fiduciary
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duty, discussed in detail with references to the record above, the amount owed to
Stevensen could rise to as much as $1,346,209. [R. 8587, pp. 584:3-585:14; Exhibit 97;
8020.] The jury could have used the data provided by Mr. Teuscher to calculate its
verdict.
2. Deane Smith testified that the net amount owed to Stevensen was $-26,240, but
Deane Smith and Russell Watts also testified that his calculations may have included the
double billing of the development fee of $451,000, because it was credited to Watts'
capital account in 2000 and then charged as an expense by Watts in 2002. [R. 8589, pp.
1148:11-13, 1150:1-13; 8590, pp. 1364:3-1368:14.] Adjusting for that breach of fiduciary
duty alone would have lead to a jury verdict of $199,260. Deane Smith also testified that
he credited Watts' capital account for a $631,000 capital contribution based on paragraph
6.1 of the Operating Agreement, even though paragraph 7.1 says that Watts is NOT to
receive such a credit.

[R. 8590, pp. 1354:10-1358:24; Exhibit 4 (page 4); 8016.]

Correcting that error alone would have changed the net amount due to Stevensen from $26,240 to $289,260 by adding $315,500 to the amount due to Stevensen, according to Mr.
Smith. [R. 8589, pp. 1151:13-1154:23.] The jury may have also concluded that even if
Watts had been entitled to a development fee, that he did not earn the fee that he charged
to develop the project unsuccessfully. [R. 8590, pp. 1360:10-1361:23.] The jury may
have also made specific adjustments relative to specific categories associated with Watts'
breach of fiduciary duty, as discussed in detail with references to the record above, to
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calculate its verdict. [R. 8587, pp. 581:25-583:2, 584:4-19, 588:15-23, 589:14-24; 8589,
pp. 1158:4-1159:5, 1162:7-1164:9; Exhibits 97and 762; 8020, 8041.]
3.

The jury may have determined that Watts' breaches of fiduciary duty

contributed to a delay in the completion of construction or in the sale of the units, as
discussed in detail with references to the record above. The delay added nothing to the
value of the units, but did result in interest charges rising to $1,046,978. [R. 8584, pp.
91:2-93:3, 94:18-25; 8589, p. 8589, p. 15-22; Exhibit 70 (second page), 97 (Exhibit D)
and 762; 8019 and 8041.] The jury may have included a portion of that interest expense
in its calculation of damages.
4. The jury may have determined that certain expenses paid by The Club were
improper. As an example, advertising expenses that should have been paid by the Watts
Group totaled $374,000, legal fees that should have been paid by Watts, and expenses for
which defendants were unable to provide any evidentiary support or other justification
may have been included by the jury in its calculation of damages. [R. 8587, pp. 586:19587:3; Exhibits 83-93 and 97; 8020.] Again, advertising and Watts' legal fees did nothing
to increase the value of the condominium units.
5. The appraisal report by Gary Free also supports the jury's verdict. [R. Exhibit
16; 8016.] The report states the expected sales value and time required for sales based on
the plans represented to the appraiser. The report also warns that the market would not
be able to absorbed higher priced condominium units. [R. 8588, pp. 793:12-794:11;
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Exhibit 16 (page 64); 8016 and 8994.] By adhering to the plans and the construction
budgets represented to the bank on an ongoing basis, even commencing as late as
October 1998 when Watts knew the project was in trouble, as discussed in detail with
references to the record above, the condominium units could have been built and sold for
a profit. After payment to Stevensen for the land, the amount owed to Stevensen would
have been much more than the $474,000 jury verdict.
6. The total unpaid 1% fees was $61,548.09, a fact determined by the Trial Court
prior to trial and unchallenged by appellant. The jury awarded a total of $474,000 to
Stevensen 3 rd East, L.C. Therefore, in addition to the $61,548.09 in 1% fees, the jury
determined that $412,451.91 was owed. The balance owed to Stevensen is less than the
value of the land he contributed to the Club. Pursuant to the Court Order, dated March
16, 2005, the net value of the land was $631,000. [R. 4022-23.] $479,000 was left in
Stevensen's capital account as the unpaid balance owed for the land. The jury awarded
less than that amount, meaning that they determined that there was some loss on the
project borne by Stevensen. Consequently, all of the payments due with regard to the
$412,451.91 determined by the jury fall within the provisions of paragraph 9 of the
March agreement, as repayment for the residual left owing on the land.
C.
THE EVIDENCE REFERENCED BY APPELLANT IN NO WAY
UNDERMINES THE JURY'S VERDICT.
Appellant's brief acknowledges the extremely high standard required to overturn a
verdict rendered by a jury. Nonetheless, appellant's presentation entirely violates the
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principles articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Chen v. Stewart, supra, 2004 UT 82,
at par 77.
First, on pages 18-30 appellant does a meager job of marshalling evidence.
Appellant fails to even come close to summarizing all of the testimony and exhibits upon
which the jury's findings were based.

Second, appellant fails to play the "devil's

advocate" and even consider how the evidence in the case might actually be construed in
a manner supporting the jury's verdict. Doing so is particularly important in this case,
because as presented above there are so many theories upon which the jury may have
properly based its finding liability. Third, without relating its arguments to the possible
basis of liability, appellant begins making arguments on page 31 which fail to relate to
the basis of the jury's verdict. Even if any of appellant's arguments were correct, it
would not mean that the jury's verdict could be overturned. Stevensen responds to each
of appellants arguments as follows:
A. Breach of fiduciary duty is a tort. The jury instructions, which appellant does
not challenge, defined fiduciary duties in terms of care, loyalty, honesty and good faith.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury deviated from those instructions
and found Watts liable on the basis of a breach of contract theory.
B. Appellant's argument that Stevensen was legally entitled to inspect the records
of The Club ignores the fact that Watts Corporation, not The Club, maintained all of the
construction records.

Appellant's argument also ignores that the jury may have
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concluded that inspection of records would not somehow have stopped Watts from
breaching his fiduciary duties. In the first place, Watts was providing false construction
documentation to the bank and misleading his own architect on the project. Given the
fact that Watts immediately cut Stevensen off financially when Stevensen challenged
Watts for the very first time in September 1999, it stands to reason that Watts wouldn't
have acted any more fairly if Stevensen had been capable of discovering Watts'
wrongdoing sooner. Watts had the power to act in any way he wanted from the day
Stevensen deeded his land to The Club.
C. Appellant grossly misstates the basis for Mr. Larsen's opinions. Appellant also
fails to recognize that Johnathan Dazely himself testified that he was kept in the dark
concerning budgets and changes to the construction. Dazely's testimony was that he was
involved only for a very short period of time at the commencement of construction,
which backed up Mr. Larsen's characterization, notwithstanding appellant's efforts to
impeach Mr. Larsen. In addition, the jury had many reasons besides appellant's limited
references to the testimony of Mr. Larsen to conclude that Watts breached his fiduciary
duties.
3. Appellant grossly misstates the basis for Mr. Larsen's opinions.

While

appellant may disagree with Mr. Larsen's opinions, appellant failed to call a construction
expert at trial to counter those opinions.

Of course, in order to disagree with Mr.

Larsen's statements about changes leading to delay and increase costs, appellant has to
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contradict his own trial testimony. Watts himself testified that the reason for the delay
and increases in costs was his design changes after October 1998. There is no legal
reason that he jury had to agree with Watts' self-serving testimony that such changes
were prudent business decisions, particularly in light of the evidence that at least two real
estate appraisers had warned Watts that the market would not be able to absorb higher
priced condominiums. [R. 8588, pp. 793:12-794:11; Exhibit 16 (page 64) and 458; 8016
and 8028.] There was also significant evidence that Watts Corporation, not merely the
bank, was charging significant amounts of money in interest for the increased
construction costs resulting from the changes. There were many instances in which
Watts' actions benefitted himself to the detriment of Stevensen. Since the jury found
Watts liable for the sum of $474,000, they obviously disagreed with appellant's
unsubstantiated claim that Stevensen was not entitled to any further payment.

In

addition, the jury had many reasons besides appellant's limited references to the
testimony of Mr. Larsen to conclude that Watts breached his fiduciary duties.
E. Appellant presents one argument claiming that Watts was protected in relying
on his lawyer as an expert, and thereby excused from the duties he owed to Stevensen,
and another argument claiming Watts had the right to reject the advice of real estate
appraisers as experts. It is unclear how these inconsistent arguments might be applied to
relieve Watts of his fiduciary duties. It is unclear how appellant has reasoned that the
jury may have made a mistake in following jury instruction nos. 51 or 52.
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F. Appellant's expert, Mr. Smith, is the witness that identified that the $451,000
fee in question may have been double paid to Watts. Mr. Smith testified that he deducted
the $451,000 in his capital accounting, and that he also deducted expenses for 2002 in his
accounting which may have included charging The Club the $451,000 fee. Nonetheless,
there is no evidence that the jury calculated the possible double payment of the fee in
arriving at their damages figure. Again, appellant's failure to first marshal the damages
evidence dooms their appeal.
4.3.

Appellant's argument completely ignores the substance of the testimony

presented by Stevensen's expert witnesses.

Just because they answered one or two

questions on cross examination by stating "I don't know," does not mean that they were
unable to describe the support which they had for the opinions that they rendered in the
case. If they responded to a questions with an "I don't know," one can only presume that
their testimony was not based on the information sought by appellant's cross
examination. Likewise, the jury listened to different witnesses for different pieces of
evidence. They listened to Mr. Larsen for information about the construction industry
and to Mr. Teusher for the presentation of financial data.

They obtained factual

information from fact witnesses and documents. To say that one witness did not provide
every piece of evidence from which the case was constructed means nothing to the
outcome of the case.
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Appellant's argument also makes the mistake of assuming that the jury believed
the testimony presented by appellant's witnesses at trial. Appellant's witness were all
discredited on cross examination at trial. That is the reason that on appeal, the appellate
courts assume that testimony contrary to the verdict was disbelieved and only look to
ascertain whether there is evidence supporting the verdict. As discussed above, there was
adequate evidence of proximate cause and damages presented to the jury. See argument
V.B., above. Appellant simply fails to marshal the evidence and grapple with the real
issues in the case.
Appellant's issue no. 4 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact
nor warranted by existing law. Appellant has grossly failed in its duty to marshal the
evidence, appellant has grossly mischaracterized the foundation and conclusions of the
expert testimony in the case, and appellant's straw man arguments grossly ignore the
evidence upon which the jury may have ultimately based its verdict.
VI. APPELLANT IGNORES THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HOLDING
IN SMITH V. FAIRFAX ON THE ISSUE OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
Appellant challenges the award of prejudgment interest without referencing or
discussing the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, inc., 2003
UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064 or its progeny. The parties briefed the issue for the Trial Court, and
appellant is aware that Smith v. Fairfax is the definitive case on point. Yet, appellants
fail to cite or discuss Smith v. Fairfax for the apparent reason that the Utah Supreme
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Court described the distinction between cases in which prejudgment interest is or is not
appropriate.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly articulated the circumstances in which
prejudgment interest should be awarded. The Utah Supreme Court explained in Smith v.
Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064, at 17, u*As established nearly a century
ago in Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., Utah courts award prejudgment interest in
cases where "damages are complete" and can be measured by "fixed rules of evidence
and known standards of value." 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907); see also Cornia, 898 P.2d
at 1387; Bjork v. April Indus. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977)." The Supreme Court
further explained in Smith v. Fairfax, at 20:
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before
judgment in a given case or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages are
complete and must be ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance with
fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the court or jury must
follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their best judgment in
assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future injury, or for
elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of value. 88 P. at 1007.
Thus, we do not require that damages necessarily be liquidated, but we deny
awards of prejudgment interest in cases where damage amounts are to be
determined by the broad discretion of the jury. "In all personal injury cases, cases
of death by wrongful act, libel, slander, false imprisonment. . . and all cases where
the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to
assess at the time of the trial, no interest is permissible." Id. at 1006.
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Fairfax upheld the award of prejudgment interest
on sums awarded by the jury which represented the jury's determination of the fair
market value of Smith's interests in a REIT investment. The Supreme Court held that
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where the jury had been presented with an appraisal of the value of the investment, the
award of prejudgment interest was appropriate. The Supreme Court explained:
The fact that the parties disputed the value of the property at trial does not change
our conclusion that the jury's determination of the property's value was
"ascertained . . . in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards
of value." Fell 88 P. at 1007. Therefore, we uphold the trial court's decision to
award prejudgment interest.
Id. at 23.
An award of prejudgment interest in the present case is appropriate for the same
reasons. Two economic experts provided testimony concerning damages to the jury.
Both experts were CPAs and applied generally accepted accounting principles, which
reflect "fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value." Both CPAs presented the
exact amount of revenue actually generated by the business activity of The Club, as well
as the exact amount of expenses paid by The Club to Watts, his companies, and third
parties. The jury was given only the limited decision to determine which specific items
of expense were unjustified under the circumstances. The jury used the simple method of
additional and subtraction of expenditures set forth in the evidence to arrive at a damages
figure. Both Smith v. Fairfax Realty and the present case involved a dispute about the
amount of damages, with calculations of damages offered by financial experts. The
Supreme Court held that where damages are capable of presentation by experts based on
financial data, the requirement established by Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 88 P.
1003, 1007 (Utah 1907) that damages can be measured by "fixed rules of evidence and
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known standards of value" is met. Certainly, if the appraisal evidence in Smith v. Fairfax
Realty meets the standard, then using exact financial entries from the books of the
company meets the standard in the present case.
Damages which cannot be measured by "fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value" are those associated with "personal injury cases, cases of death by
wrongful act, libel, slander, false imprisonment . . ." Smith v. Fairfax, at 20; Fell v.
Union Pacific Railway Co., at 1006. Appellant cites Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co.
and cases such as personal injury cases and cases in which the issue was something akin
to "cattle's expected pregnancy rates, weight range, loss rates, and market prices ... v
Obviously, a personal injury case will not produce a holding instructive to a case in
which damages are based purely on financial records.
It is unnecessary for purposes of prejudgment interest to know which particular
expense the jury added or subtracted to arrive at their verdict. There were no broken
bones or intangible damages involved. Appellant fails to reference a single case in which
prejudgment interest was disallowed on the basis of calculations originating with the
actual accounting records of a company.

In citing Iron Head Construction, Inc. v.

Gurney, 2008 UT App 1, 176 P.3d 453, appellant also seems to have ignored the entire
context in which prejudgment interest was upheld with respect to a settlement of both
equitable and contractual claims. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Iron Head, at
par. 20, the very arguments being made by appellants in this case were rejected in both
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Smith v. Fairfax and in Bennett v. Huish, 2007 Utah App. 19, at par. 45. Appellant also
cites Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Mgmt., 2005 Utah App. 430, 124 P.3d 269, but fails to
inform this Court that Orlob also upheld the award of prejudgment interest, rejecting
arguments similar to those of the appellant in the present case.
In order to deter a breach of fiduciary duty, Courts have uniformly held that the
plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on damages associated with a claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. 59A Am.Jur. 2d, Partnership, Section 360, 658 (2003). The Utah
Supreme Court in Smith v. Fairfax chose not to determine whether or not Utah would
follow the same holding, because it upheld the award of prejudgment interest on the
grounds stated above. Nonetheless, the Smith v. Fairfax case implies that such a holding
might very well be adopted for breach of fiduciary duty cases in Utah in which the Fell
standard did not apply. Smith v. Fairfax, supra, at 18-19 (Affirming trial court's award of
prejudgment interest on other grounds, making it unnecessary to consider whether or not
Utah should follow other states in awarding prejudgment interest in all cases of breach of
fiduciary duty).
The rationale for awarding prejudgment interest in situations involving breach of
fiduciary duty is to remove the incentive for a fiduciary to enjoy a windfall by delaying
payment to the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant. The Illinois Supreme Court
stated, "In situations such as the instant one involving the breach of fiduciary duty, the
law does not permit defendants to obtain the beneficial use of plaintiff s funds at no cost
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to the wrong doer, and in determining the appropriate damages in such case. "So focused
on making the plaintiff whole by placing him in a posture which assumes that he had the
opportunity to utilize his funds in a reasonable manner." In re Estate of Wernicke 502
N.E. 2d 1146, 1154 (111. App. 1986). In a companion case, the Illinois Supreme Court
further stated, "The rationale underline an equitable award of prejudgment interest in a
case involving a breach of fiduciary duty is to make the injured party complete by forcing
the fiduciary to account for profits and interest he gained of the use of the injured parties'
money. The injured party is thus compensated for any economic loss occasioned by the
inability to use his money. Prejudgment interest in this context acts as a concept of
fairness and equity, and not as a sanction against the defendant. Fundamental principles
of damages and compensation dictate that when money has been wrongfully withheld
that it can receive interest for the wrongdoer's retention of his money." In re Estate of
Wernicke 535 N.E. 2d 876, 888 (111. 1989). Other Courts are in accord. See Rolf v.
Blythe, Eastman Pillion & Co., Inc. 637 F.2d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 1980) ("An award of
prejudgment interest is in the first instance, compensatory, and is customary in cases
involving breach of fiduciary duty."); Jefferson Natl. Bank of Miami Beach v. Central
Natl. Bank in Chicago, 700 F.2d 1143, 1155 (7th Cir. 1983) (Holding in breach of
fiduciary duty case that "Trustee who commits a breach of trust and incurs liability for a
certain amount of money and the loss of income thereon is properly accountable not only
for the return of the money but also interest actually received by him during that
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period."); In re Estate of Lash, 747 A.2d 327, 335 (N.J. Sup. 2000) Applying the rule that
i n an action for breach of fiduciary duty, the available remedies include a surcharge in
the amount of misappropriated funds plus prejudgment interest."); McDermott v. Party
City Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 612, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (''prejudgment interest is available
for awards of breach of fiduciary duty."); Michaelson v. Hamada, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343,
353 (Cal. A 1994) (Where defendant breached fiduciary duty, citing cases confirming
that an award of compound interest is appropriate in this type of case.); Ryan v. City of
Chicago, 654 N.E. 2d 483, 486, 489 (111. App. 1995) (Awarding compound interest on a
breach of fiduciary duty claim, where "compound interest was required in order to make
full, equitable restitution" under pension code). Guardianship of Chandos, 504 P.2d 524
(Ariz. App. 1972).
Were the calculation of interest in the present case to fall outside of the Fell
standard for any reason, the equities in this case would clearly dictate that interest be
awarded. The jury found that Watts was guilty of not mere negligence in violating his
fiduciary duties, but that his violation rose to a level of gross negligence and/or willful
misconduct. It would be patently unjust to allow Watts the free use of money owed to
Stevensen for the past 9 years, in light of the degree of Mr. Watts' wrongdoing and the
impact it has had on Stevensen and its members.
Appellant's issue no. 5 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact
nor warranted by existing law. Because appellant has knowingly omitted a discussion of

(
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Smith v. Fairfax and has cited both Iron Head and Orlob in his brief, without informing
this Court of their actual holdings or making any attempt to distinguish them, this Court
should conclude that the appeal is not made in good faith and oral argument should not be
permitted.
VII. THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED REFLECTS A
PROPER EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION.
Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining the
appropriate amount of attorney's fees awarded. The Trial Court had no obligation to
consider appellants arguments, because appellant failed to make any objection as to the
amount of the fees prior to the time of hearing on the motion in question. Stevensen
submitted his first affidavit of costs, expenses and attorney fees, including a full detailed
breakdown of the work performed, the dates, the hourly rate, and so forth on February 16,
2007. [R. 8269-91.] Appellants did not make any objection to the amount of attorney
fees claimed in their memorandum in opposition, dated March 1, 2007. [R. 8316-28.] A
hearing on the matter was held April 30, 2007. [R. 8417, 8583, p. 1-67.] The Trial Court
ruled in favor of Stevensen and directed counsel for Stevensen to prepare an order based
on the successful motion. [R. 8417, 8583, p. 66:18-67:5.] Appellant did not file its first
objection to the amount of fees until May 7, 2007. [R.8423-8425.]

The Trial Court

acknowledge that fact in the hearing held July 5, 2007. [R. 8583, pp.79:25-80:2, 87:1222.] And appellant acknowledged the failure. [R. 8583, p. 85:14-18.]
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Notwithstanding appellant's failure, the Trial Court received supplemental
briefing and scheduled further oral argument on this point, and clearly articulated the
basis of its determination. Hearings were held on July 5, 2007 and August 13, 2007. [R.
8583, p. 68-134.] In response to the request of the Trial Court, Stevensen submitted a
second affidavit containing a detailed analysis of time spent on various activities such as
communicating with clients, communicating with opposing counsel, discovery, legal
research, successful motions, unsuccessful motions, trial preparation and trial, and post
trial motions. [R. 8487-8516.] The affidavit indicated that fewer than 10 hours were
allocated to a party other that appellant, and even described Stevensen's position as to
those hours that might be the subject of some dispute by appellant, including addressing
unsuccessful claims.

[R. 8489-90.] These details were then discussed again at the

hearing held August 13,2007. [R. 8583, p. 102:24-110:24, 112:4-118:6, 118:10-119:17,
123:5-124:19.] The Trial Court then made a detailed ruling as to the factors considered,
and reduced the award of attorney fees from $261,320 requested to $226,400 awarded.
[R. 8583, p. 125:24-128:13.] Appellant's claim that the Trial Court did not undertake
such a process is frivolous as a matter of law.
The amount of an award of attorneys fees is within the broad discretion of the trial
Court. Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) (fee awarded by trial court
will not be disturbed absent "showing of patent error or clear abuse of discretion");
Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1978) (fee awarded by trial court will
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not be disturbed "in the absence of patent error or clear abuse of discretion"); Dixie State
Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (trial court to weigh large variety of
factors in determining a reasonable fee);. Fundamental considerations include:
The difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in the
case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved.
Id. at 989. Considerations may also include the legal work actually performed, the
portion of the work reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter, and other
circumstances, such as factors listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Ld- at
990.
What constitutes adequate evidentiary support for a request for attorneys fees was
described in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268-70 (Utah 1992) as hours
spent on the case, the hourly rate charged for those hours, the usual and customary rates
for such work, and some allocation of the hours relative to the underlying claims and the
parties involved. Although no request was made by appellant in this case, an opposing
party may request access to supporting documents for purposes of contesting the
evidence presented. Id. at 266. Appellant also cites Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah
1998) for the same proposition. Nonetheless, in Foote, the trial court failed to undertake
an analysis of the reasonableness of the fees requested.

Id. at 56.

Similarly, in

Cottonwood Mall Co., the plaintiffs affidavit failed to even delineate basic information

i
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such as the work performed, the billing rate or the hours spent. Cottonwood Mall Co. v.
Sine, 830 P.2d at 269.
The fee award can also be upheld based on evidence that there was a contingency
fee arrangement. [R. 8490.] The Utah Supreme Court in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins.
Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996) held that attorneys fees were foreseeable, and found that
the findings of the trial court were clearly erroneous in failing to recognize the likelihood
that an attorney would be hired on a contingency fee basis. Id. at 468.
In the present case, Stevensen provided a very detailed breakdown of the attorney
fees requested, addressing the elements named by each of the cases cited. The Trial
Court expressly found that it had adequate evidence before it to fully evaluate the
appropriate amount of the attorney fee to be awarded, including but not limited to an
evaluation of successful claims, unsuccessful claims, the work performed, the hourly rate
and its reasonableness for this type of litigation in Salt Lake County. In making its
ruling, the Trial Court commented on its familiarity with the case, its considerable
complexity, the work necessary to present the case in a well organized and expert fashion
to the jury, and the litigation process need to bring the case to that point. The Trial Court
made a determination to reduce the fee requested by approximately $35,000 based on its
evaluation of what was reasonable and necessary relative to the results achieved. The
Trial Court stated that it did not rely on the contingency fee arrangement in evidence.
Since the affidavit and the further evidence on the record and available to the Trial Court
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were sufficient to allow the Trial Court to evaluate all of the essential factors for
determination of a reasonable attorney fee, appellant's challenge to the amount solely on
the basis of an inadequate affidavit is not made in good faith. Appellant appears to
simply be making the same arguments to this Court which it argued unsuccessfully to the
Trial Court, without recognizing that this Court will not simply substitute its judgment for
that of the Trial Court absent a "showing of patent error or clear abuse of discretion."
Appellant's issue no. 6 is frivolous, because the appeal is neither grounded in fact
nor warranted by existing law. Stevensen's affidavit supporting its motion for fees,
combined with the extensive briefing, oral argument and the familiarity of the Trial Court
were adequate as a matter of law. Appellant's contention that the Trial Court lacked the
information necessary to determine the appropriate amount of fees is not made in good
faith and oral argument is unwarranted.
VIII. THE COSTS AWARDED REFLECT A PROPER EXERCISE OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION.
Appellant objects to the Trial Court's exercise of its discretion in determining the
appropriate amount of costs awarded. Again, the Trial Court received extensive briefing
and oral argument on this point, and clearly articulated the basis of its determination.
Appellant's challenge is frivolous, because the law does not permit parties to ask the
Appellate Courts to substitute their own discretion for that of the Trial Court where there
is an adequate basis for the Trial Court's decision. Appellant has also failed to marshal
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the evidence associated with the Trial Court's decision to award certain expenses of
litigation as consequential damages, rather than as taxable costs.
Stevensen is entitled to its taxable costs, as provided by Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 54. The determination of taxable costs is discretionary with the Trial
Court, subject to the Appellate Court's review for an abuse of discretion. Young v. State,
16 P.3 549, 551 (Utah 2000); Morgan v. Morgan, 795.P.2d 684, 686 (Utah App. 1990).
Filing fees, witness fees, and deposition costs constitute the categories of ordinary taxable
costs. Id. at 686-87. Deposition costs are recoverable, even if not used in the course of
trial, if the Trial Court believes the depositions were "taken in good faith and, in light of
the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development and presentation of the
case." Young v. State, supra, at 551. The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that the
cost of depositions are generally allowed when reasonably necessary when "the
development of the case is of such a complex nature that discovery cannot be
accomplished through the less expensive method of interrogatories, requests for
admissions, and requests for production of documents." Highland Const. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984).9

9

Appellant refers to Lloyds Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507,
512 (1988) and John Price Assoc, Inc. v. Davis, 588 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978), in which
the Utah Supreme Court made the same or similar statements in the course of upholding
the trial court's decision not to award deposition fees. The holdings, thus, stand for the
proposition that awarding deposition costs is discretionary with the trial court on the basis
of the factors articulated.
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In the present case, Stevensen incurred taxable costs in this matter consisting of
the filing fee of $170.00, witness fees of $36.50, and deposition costs of $2,187.20. The
Trial Court expressly found that such costs were reasonable and necessary to the present
litigation. The witness fees were actually those paid to the appellant Watts himself for
the trial that went forward, as well as one of the prior scheduled trials. The deposition
costs included the depositions of Ted Stevensen ($280.40) and Watts ($1,616.75) which
were used repeatedly during trial and were essential to the case, as well as Bryan Todd
($290.05). While Bryan Todd did not appear as a witness at trial, his deposition was
taken in good faith and was essential to discovery concerning the meaning of the
Operating Agreement he drafted for the parties and the work he did relative to the land
contributed by Stevensen to the Club, which were subjects of considerable testimony at
trial. Given the considerable complexity of the case, there is no way that the case could
have been prepared for trial without the three depositions merely by using interrogatories
or other written discovery methods. For only three depositions to be taken in a case as
complicated as the present case, it could reasonably be concluded by the Trial Court that
each of the depositions was taken in good faith and was essential to the development and
presentation of the case. It should be apparent that the parties took only those depositions
that were essential. The Trial Court followed the holding in Young v. State and found
that said depositions were "taken in good faith and, in light of the circumstances.
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appeared to be essential for the development and presentation of the case." The Trial
Court properly exercised its discretion in awarding taxable costs.
In the present case, the Trial Court also awarded expert witness fees, copy
expenses, and service of process fees as reasonably foreseeable consequential damages,
not as taxable costs. [R. 8560-61.] The only issue for appeal is whether expenses that
were not taxable costs can be awarded as consequential damages. If there is any legal
basis, then the decision of the Trial Court and the amount of expenses awarded must be
upheld. To answer the question of whether or not a plaintiff is entitled to expenses as
consequential damages, the Court must ask the same question that was posed by the Utah
Supreme Court in the cases of Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468
(Utah 1996), Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985), Heslop v.
Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1992), and Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 325 P.2d 906, 908 (Utah 1958). The question is
whether such expenses are consequential damages arising from defendant Watts' breach
of fiduciary duty which were ^reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." See Billings v. Union
Bankers Ins. Co., at 468; Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, at 801.
Watts did have a contract to act as the manage of The Club. As in Heslop v. Bank
of Utah, the employment contract was an implied-in-fact contract. Watts was appointed
as the manager by the Operating Agreement of The Club. Watts was aware of the
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appointment, accepted the appointment and performed the duties of the manager under an
implied-in-fact employment contract. It was foreseeable at the time the employment of
Watts as the manager of The Club arose that if he breached his fiduciary duties that he
owed as the manager of The Club, plaintiff would necessarily bring a legal action and
incur attorney fees and expenses in the course of the litigation. The Trial Court expressly
found that this was the case. [R. 8583, pp. 61:12-62:18, 65:5-20, 66:23-67:3.] Appellant
cites Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline Equipment, L.L.C., 2006 UT App 446, par. 21,
147 P.3d 951 for the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court only allows attorneys fees
as consequential damages in limited cases where there is a contract.

Appellant's

argument ignores the fact that there was a written contract in the form of the operating
agreement of The Club which governed Watts' employment and duties as the manager of
The Club, and that Watts further had an implied-in-fact contract with fiduciary duties
running to Stevensen. In Heslop v. Bank of Utah, the employment contract was an
implied-in-fact contract.
Of course, since appellant has not marshaled the evidence concerning Watts
employment by The Club as the manager and his employment by Watts Corporation as
the contractor, and how he breached his fiduciary duties, appellant has failed to provide
this Court with a context to evaluate the decision that the Trial Court made in finding that
Stevensen was entitled to the expenses in question as consequential damages under the
unique circumstances of this case.
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The present case also reflects the equities in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.
and Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. As with an insurer's breach of the express or
implied terms of an insurance contract, it is reasonably foreseeable that legal action will
result when a manager acts with gross negligence or willful misconduct in the breach of
the fiduciary duties he owes in a closely held company such as The Club. Watts was
aware that plaintiff was dependant upon his good faith, conscientious performance of his
duties. Watts was aware of the large volume of documents involved in the construction
of the Club condominiums and the necessity for those documents to be copied an
analyzed by experts in order to ascertain what he had done during the course of
construction.

All of the parties recognized the complexity of the case and worked

diligently to simplify matters as much as possible for presentation to the jury in the
course of 7 days. As the above-cited testimony of Lynn Larsen, plaintiffs construction
expert, and Johnathan Dazely, defendants' architect, brought out, Watts was the only
person in possession of the information concerning the constantly changing costs of the
construction project.

Rather than having the architect review construction invoices

during the course of construction, as required by the industry standards, Watts chose to
keep the architect uniformed about the budget while Watts purported to fill the role of the
architect himself. The fact that Watts was the sole repository of all construction cost
information made it possible for him to conceal cost information, which necessarily
required his deposition, considerable document discovery, and the use of experts to
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analyze the construction process and the financial records in the case. Because the
attorney fees and expenses of litigation were the foreseeable consequences of Watts'
action, they should be awarded as consequential damages.
Other states have specifically ruled that attorneys fees are recoverable in cases of
breach of fiduciary duty. Allard v. First Interstate Bank of Washington, 768 P.2d 998,
1001 (Wash. 1989); Pauley v. Gilbert, 582 S.E.2d 208, 217 (W.Va. 1999). Although a
question of first impression in Utah, it is likely that Utah will follow this rule should the
appropriate case arise. The present case illustrates the importance of following such a
course in the state of Utah. Watts was in a position of trust and a position in which he
was uniquely qualified and able to take advantage of the naivety of Stevensen, with its
principle being a man in his 70s without the extensive real estate development experience
that Watts had. In addition to acting as the manager of the company, Watts controlled all
elements of the development and construction. He was the president of the construction
company and was on site several times each week. He controlled all of the construction
records through his construction company (not through The Club where they would be
available for inspection by Stevensen as appellant implies). He dismissed the architect
from the job shortly before changing course to take the project millions of dollars over
budget in order to eliminate any supervision. He then willfully, or at least with gross
negligence, betrayed that trust and benefited himself to the detriment of Stevensen. In
this unique position, it is only the power of the courts which will prevent men like Watts
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from intentionally abusing their position for their own profit at the expense of others.
Where the expenses of litigation are foreseeable consequences of a breach of fiduciary
duty, they must be awarded, not in any punitive way but in recognition that such
expenses are part of the damage caused by dishonesty in business.
IX. THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED
WITHOUT HEARING AND FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED,
BECAUSE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE FRIVOLOUS.
A frivolous appeal uis one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law."
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(b).
In the present case, appellant seeks to characterize numerous elements of the
underlying litigation in a manner contrary to the record. While appellant may consider its
characterization as a function of "advocacy," such an approach ignores the legal standard
upon which such an appeal must be based. Appellant must recognize that in order to
prevail on the appeal of a jury's findings, all facts must be construed in support of the
verdict.

In order to challenge matters within the discretion of the Trial Court, an

appellant must show a clear abuse of discretion.

In challenging the Trial Court's

decisions on issues of law, an appellant must show that the alleged error altered the
outcome of the case. Only after presenting the record to the appellate court in that light
can the appellant advocate that the evidence is insufficient to support the actions of the
Trial Court or the findings of the jury. Ignoring evidence in the record is not a proper
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approach to advocacy. Instead, ignoring evidence in the record gives rise to an appeal
"not grounded in fact." Likewise, the appellants failure to transcribe necessary pretrial
hearings gives rise to an appeal "not grounded in fact" because of the missing record In
this case, appellant's arguments are not grounded in fact, nor are they warranted by
existing law.
Stevensen requests an award of attorney's fees incurred in responding to the
frivolous appeal in this action, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33.
Stevensen further requests that the appeal in this action be dismissed without hearing, in
order to avoid further unnecessary delay or needless increase in the costs of litigation.
CONCLUSION
Appellee Stevensen respectfully requests that the appeal in this matter be
dismissed without hearing, based on appellant's failure to marshal the relevant evidence,
failure to properly address applicable case law, and lack of good faith in bringing the
present appeal.

Stevensen further requests an award of his costs and attorneys fees

incurred herein, on the basis that the appeal is frivolous, pursuant to Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Rule 33.
ADDENDUM
Any references to addendum herein are references to the addendum supplied by
appellant. No further addendum is required.
DATED this 5 £ day of October, 2008.
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